We model the impact credit constraints and market risk have on the vertical relationships between …rms in the supply chain. As credit-constrained …rms become endogenously risk averse, the optimal supply contract contract involves risk sharing, thereby inducing double marginalization and higher retail prices. The model gives rise to a new motive for outsourcing supply (or distribution). We identify an intrinsic complementarity between supply and lending, which can help explain the existence of …nance arms of major suppliers, and a novel monetary transmission mechanism linking interest rates with short-run pricing that can help explain the price puzzle in macroeconomics.
Introduction
Credit constraints have been known to be a part of corporate reality for decades (Hubbard, 1998 , and references therein). Massively reduced access to credit has been a feature of the major …nancial crisis of recent years. 1 It is also well known that …rms are subject to substantial market risk -whether on the demand side or supply side. Incorporating insights from the corporate …nance literature into an industrial organization model of the vertical supply chain, we study the interaction between credit constraints and market risk, and their e¤ects on short-run retail pricing, long-run investment, and welfare. We show that credit constraints and market risk impact optimal vertical contracting, creating scope for …nance arms, risk sharing, slotting fees, and outsourcing. Further, we identify a new monetary transmission mechanism from interest rates to the real economy which acts via …rms which are at risk of becoming credit constrained.
Consider a …rm exposed to demand-side risk which has some investment opportunities, and yet is credit constrained. To fund future investment assets must be accrued which will serve as collateral. These assets are amassed by business activities in the short run. Hence, as evidence corroborates, credit constrained …rms'investment level is closely related to their cash ‡ow (Gertler and Gilchrist 1994) . Now suppose investment is subject to diminishing marginal returns. We show that this causes a risk neutral …rm to be endogenously risk averse in its business activities in the short run. Low demand realizations limit the collateral which the …rm can use for investment and so would result in very low investment returns. Thus risk aversion becomes an inherent feature of the …rm's short run objective function. Moreover, the extent of risk aversion is endogenously determined by market parameters such as the interest rate and quality of corporate governance.
The endogenously risk-averse …rm will seek some insurance from its vertical partners.
Consider how this process operates between a credit-constrained …rm and its input supplier. The downstream …rm, exposed to market demand risk and credit constrained, wishes to pass risk back up to her supplier. So she demands a risk-sharing contract in which the supplier bears some loss for poor demand realizations. But for the supplier to recoup these potential losses she requires payments in high demand states to grow at a rate faster than cost. That is, double marginalization is introduced, causing the retail price of the …rm to rise. The cost of the insurance made necessary by the credit constraints is in this sense partly paid for by …nal consumers.
To see why ine¢ cient pricing must arise here note that the optimal supply contract cannot fully insure the downstream …rm. Such full insurance would require the downstream …rm to be paid the expected pro…t and pay an input price equal to the monopoly retail price to the supplier. However, if prices (or the quality of the shopping experience)
are not contractible, then the downstream …rm would be tempted to raise its retail price slightly and so make some variable pro…t on lower volumes. This is anticipated by the upstream …rm, making double marginalization unavoidable.
Double marginalization occurs in many industries and its impact on myopic pro…ts for the chain can be of the order of 10% (Mortimer, 2008) . Why such ine¢ cient contracts exist at all is not very well understood. Some have argued that simplicity is the cause, others that incentives must be maintained to exert e¤ort ('double moral hazard'; see Romano 1994 ). However, under the latter explanation, it is unclear why repeated interaction could not mitigate the shirking incentives. Here, we demonstrate that credit constraints alter the shape of the …rm's payo¤ function, causing risk sharing and, hence, double marginalization to become inevitable.
The insurance service of vertical contracts we model is, we believe, re ‡ected in at least two common business practices. Firstly, risk-sharing contracts are an apparently direct manifestation of our model in which the …rm may receive explicit support for costs incurred which are repaid depending upon realized demand. Such contracts are, for example, common in the airline industry in which aeroplanes are supplied below cost, with the supplier recouping its costs by charging above cost for service. 2 Secondly, slotting fees, a common practice in the grocery market as well as in other industries such as software and publishing, are well explained by our model. These fees are …xed payments many retailers require of manufacturers in return for stocking their products. Theoretical explanations for this practice have portrayed the slotting fee as a signalling device (Klein and Wright, 2007 , and references therein). Empirical evidence suggests that an important part of the story is, however, the sharing of risk (Sudhir and Rao, forthcoming; White et al. 2000) , which accords with our model.
Having established that a credit-constrained …rm exposed to market risk derives insurance value from its vertical contracts, it follows that such a …rm has an incentive to outsource supply (or sales) to a non-credit-constrained upstream supplier (or downstream buyer). The credit-constrained …rm cannot insure itself whereas an upstream supplier (or downstream buyer) can monitor the volumes supplied to (or sold by) the …rm and is therefore in a unique position to o¤er the valuable insurance. Thus we demonstrate a theoretical link between increased market risk and increased outsourcing. Our result is supported by empirical evidence (Harrigan, 1985; Sutcli¤e and Zaheer, 1988 ) which points in this direction. The main theoretical arguments in the extant literature have had di¢ culty with this empirical evidence as they work in the opposite direction. These theories commonly cite problems of incomplete contracting, which mandate integration in the face of risk to save on contracting costs (Mahoney, 1992) .
It is standard to see the lending of loans and the supply of an input as separate practices o¤ered by di¤erent …rms. However, this need not be. In fact, we demonstrate (in Section 4) that there exists an intrinsic complementarity between the provision of insurance and lending. A supplier with access to funds at the same rate as the banking sector could 2 A case study of the case of the Embraer jet is o¤ered by Figuiredo et al. (2008) .
actually lend on rates that the independent banking sector would …nd unpro…table. This result may o¤er an original insight into the existence and pro…tability of …nance arms of major companies such as GE and Cisco. The comparative advantage of borrowing from non-bank …nancial companies is under current debate. In Section 4, we report that …nancial companies lend almost $1 for every $2 lent by a mainstream bank. Gaining
an insight into what makes …nancial companies e¤ective competitors for banks therefore seems a …rst-order issue.
The complementarity we …nd between insurance and lending arises because the supplier observes the pledgable assets required for the loan, and the volumes sold to make the pledgable assets. Thus the supplier can mitigate the …rm's moral hazard problem associated with the risk-sharing contract and reduce the amount of double marginalization. 3 Hence, linking supply to loans can result in higher industry pro…ts, lower retail prices and greater average investment than achievable with a separate bank. 4 We now turn to the question of how the optimal contract responds to changes in market parameters such as the interest rate or the quality of corporate governance. Section 5 takes up this question remaining within the fully optimal contracting framework. We demonstrate that the relevant measure of risk aversion is the absolute coe¢ cient of risk aversion of the investment returns function with respect to pledgable assets. If market variables alter so as to increase (decrease) this measure of risk aversion, then retail prices will strictly rise (fall) in the short run in all risk realizations except those for which the optimal contract involves pooling, and except for the single best state ('no distortion at the top').
We are then in a position to demonstrate that a higher interest rate increases the relevant measure of risk aversion and so leads to an increase in short-run retail prices.
This new monetary transmission mechanism is distinct from the seminal balance sheet channel of Bernanke and Gertler (1995) . The standard interpretation of the balance sheet channel is that higher interest rates will raise …rms'…xed costs and cause …rms to run down inventories and reduce investment in the medium term (Ireland, 2005 ; see also Bank of England, 1999) . We instead show that a change in the interest rate at which …rms borrow alters the relative costs of bad demand realizations which in turn alters the amount of insurance required by the downstream …rms. As this insurance demand from 3 That suppliers see volumes whereas banks do not has been noted as an important feature of trade credit by Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) . We here are not considering trade credit as the investments we consider are more naturally thought of as occurring in the medium term (and not the 30 to 60 days typical of trade credit). 4 At a general level, it is known that long-term contracts may sometimes improve upon short-term contracts (see, for example, DeMarzo and Fishman, 2008). However, whether they do or not depends on the economic environment. vertical partners is altered, so too is the retail price in the short run. This result is a new insight into the price puzzle: the macroeconomic link that has been noted between increases in the interest rate and increases in retail prices (Christiano et al., 1999 ).
All of these results are established in a benchmark model of demand side risk. However, this turns out to be inessential. We show that the same intuitions apply with supplyside risk. And neither is the take-it-or-leave-it framework we employ essential, as we demonstrate the same intuitions in bargaining extensions. These analyses are o¤ered in Section 6 and 7, respectively. Section 8 concludes, with all omitted proofs contained in the Appendix.
Our paper builds on some existing insights from the industrial organization and corporate …nance literatures. On the corporate …nance side, we build on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) in modelling credit constraints as an endogenous outcome, caused by a moral hazard problem associated with the …rm's investment project. In contrast to Holmstrom and Tirole, however, we assume that the …rm's investment project has decreasing returns. It is this decreasing returns assumption that gives rise to the …rm becoming endogenously risk averse as it means that the rate at which the marginal dollar can be leveraged is decreasing. A related point, but in a model with exogenous credit constraints, is made by Froot et al. (1993) . However, Froot et al. do not study the implications this insight has for vertical contracting and, hence, for pricing and the real economy. On the industrial organization side, Rey and Tirole (1986) note that if downstream retailers are (exogenously) risk averse, then exclusive territories have some rationale. They show that the best twopart tari¤ contract under exclusive territories involves double marginalization. Our work demonstrates that risk aversion would be expected if the …rms are credit constrained and that double marginalization results not only from two-part tari¤ contracts but even from the fully optimal contract. More importantly, however, because the …rm's risk aversion is an endogenous outcome in our model, we are able to show that there is an intrinsic complementarity between supplier insurance and lending (which may explain the existence of …nance arms) and identify a new monetary transmission mechanism linking interest rates with short-run pricing (which can help explain the price puzzle in macroeconomics).
The Model
We consider a model of a vertically related industry with two …rms, a downstream …rm D and an upstream …rm U . There are two periods: period 0 and period 1.
Period 0. In period 0, U can produce an intermediate input at marginal cost c 0.
U supplies the input to D which D transforms into a …nal good on a one-to-one basis at zero cost, and then sells on. When choosing output Q and facing market size z, D faces inverse demand p(Q=z). 5 We assume that D is exposed to market risk in that market size z is a random variable with …nite support fz 1 ; :::; z n g. A larger value of z implies that the volume supplied is a smaller proportion of the total market, and so a higher unit price results. We label states in increasing order so that 0 < z 1 < z 2 < < z n : The probability of state z i is g i , and n i=1 g i z i is the expected value of z.
Assumption 1
We make the following standard assumptions on downstream demand:
(ii) The reservation price exceeds marginal cost at Q = 0, p(0) > c, and falls below marginal cost, P (Q) < c, for Q su¢ ciently large. If D wishes to invest more than its pledgable assets, I > a, it can choose to veri…ably show its asset level a to an external banking sector so as to attempt to secure a loan of 5 D can equivalently be thought of as setting price p and facing demand zQ(p).
I a. 6 For now, we set the market interest rate to zero so that D has to pay back only the amount of the loan, I a. Any loan has to satisfy the no-shirking condition
since, otherwise, D's owner-manager would decide to shirk and D would be unable to pay back its loan.
Assumption 2
We make the following assumptions on the gross return function ( ): (ii) In equilibrium, any realized value of D's asset level a is smaller than the level necessary to …nance the …rst-best investment level, a < (B + 1) b I b I , so that the no-shirking constraint (1) is always binding in equilibrium. 
Note that Assumption 2(ii) also ensures that at I(a) the marginal gross return satis…es
The …rst inequality follows as the investment level is below the …rst best level. The second inequality is an implication of credit being constrained at I (a) : Since the no- 6 D can always choose to hide some or all of its assets. As a result, D can only prove that it has at least the asset level that it reveals. 7 The assumption that the no-shirking constraint is always binding is for convenience. What is really needed for our main results is that the constraint is binding in the worst demand state(s).
shirking constraint is binding, D's net payo¤ at the end of the second period is (I(a))
[I(a) a] BI(a). The following lemma holds:
, is (i) increasing at a rate greater than B and (ii) strictly concave in the pledgable asset level a.
Proof. Implicitly di¤erentiating I (a) in equation (2) yields
where the inequalities follow from equation (3) The positive marginal returns to investment implies that each extra dollar in pledgable income can be leveraged so that I(a) a is increasing in a. Since marginal returns are diminishing, the rate at which the marginal dollar can be leveraged is decreasing, implying
The risk aversion will a¤ect the agreement D requires from its supplier U . This will in turn a¤ect the retail prices in period 0 (the "short run") and the expected level of investment in period 1 (the "long run"). Thus credit constraints will -via the supplychain relationship -a¤ect consumer welfare both in the short and long run. We now determine how.
The Optimal Contract under Symmetric Information
Before analyzing period-0 contracting under our assumption that D has private informa- 
subject to the individual rationality constraint for U ,
This program gives rise to the following solution:
Proposition 1 When the demand state is veri…able, the equilibrium contract fQ (z i ) ; W (z i )g is such that industry pro…t is maximized in every demand state z i , Q(z i ) = z i q (c). Proof. Note …rst that U 's individual rationality constraint (4) must be binding since, otherwise, D could increase its payo¤ by o¤ering slightly lower W i 's without violating (4).
The Lagrangian, which is to be maximized over fQ i ; W i g, is given by
The remainder of the proof, which involves solving the set of …rst-order conditions, is straightforward and is therefore omitted.
Hence, the optimal contract has U bearing all the risk and D delivering a quantity which yields the price that maximizes industry pro…t in every state. Further, whatever the realization of risk, D completes period 0 with assets equal to the ex ante expected industry pro…t. U makes good any shortfall and con…scates any excess. So, in the full information case, consumers are una¤ected by the market risk. The risk aversion created for D by the credit constraints is passed up to U and no ine¢ ciency need be created.
The Optimal Contract under Asymmetric Information
We now analyze period-0 contracting under our assumption that only D observes the (unveri…able) realized demand state. This creates moral hazard for D when it is setting quantity as D could seek to deviate from reporting the true state of demand. That is D;
once the market risk is revealed, will select a quantity which maximizes D's payo¤ given the agreed input tari¤ schedule.
If the state is z i and D truthfully reports it, then she would receive a payo¤ of
Suppose instead D were to lie and claim that the state is z j , thereby requesting volume Q j in exchange for payment W j : This would mean that the retail price received by D would be p (Q j =z i ) : This yields D pledgable income of a = Q j p (Q j =z i ) W j at the end of period 0. Invoking the Revelation Principle, the optimal program therefore requires the pledgable income to be maximized when the truth is being told:
Program Bank
The optimization program when D uses an independent banking sector is given by
and the incentive constraint at the quantity setting stage for D,
This problem is isomorphic to one explored by Hart (1983) in the context of optimal labor contracts. U here maps to workers (the marginal cost c corresponding to workers' reservation wage) in Hart's analysis and D maps to a …rm demanding labor speci…cally.
The following proposition then follows:
, has the following properties:
Property 1 There is no distortion at the top:
Property 2 There is ine¢ ciently low quantity demanded in all other states:
Property 3 D's pledgable income increases in the state:
Property 4 U 's payo¤ increases in the state:
Proof. Hart (1983) yields all four conditions. 8 We have a strict inequality in his second condition as U is risk neutral here.
By exploring a general input into a downstream …rm D, we obtain important corollaries of the above proposition:
The optimal contract with a supplier U when D is subject to credit constraints and market risk results in:
1. Retail prices are too high relative to the level that would maximize joint period-0 pro…t in all except the best demand state. That is, the optimal contract induces double marginalization.
2. The optimal contract has the supplier making payments to D which are not recouped in low demand states. Hence, if marginal cost c is su¢ ciently small, W (z i ) is negative for small realized demand states z i and positive for large z i .
Proof. For part 1, note that equation (7) guarantees that the marginal revenue is above marginal cost at all demand states except for the highest. Hence, as marginal revenue is declining, we must have quantities being below (and, thus, retail prices being above) the industry-pro…t maximizing levels.
For part 2, note that U 's individual rationality constraint is binding, (8), increasing in i. Hence we must have some state
8 For D; explicitly, in Hart's notation, we have the revenue function
which satis…es Hart's Assumptions 2 (as marginal revenue is positive and declining) and 6 (as pro…t grows in high demand states). As to his Assumption 5, we require the marginal revenue to grow in high demand states. This is true as
where we have used the fact that the term in curly brackets is negative (as marginal revenue is declining). The other assumptions follow as U is assumed risk neutral and I ( ) has been shown to be concave. Here, D is endogenously risk averse (due to the interaction of the diminishing returns with the endogenous credit constraints), whereas in Hart, D is assumed risk averse.
Since U optimally shares in some of the risk, W 1 Q 1 c < 0 and W n Q n c > 0.
In the absence of either credit constraints or market risk, or both, the optimal supply contract would stipulate quantity z i q (c) in state z i , resulting in the retail price p(q(c)) that maximizes joint period-0 pro…t. Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 show that the interaction of credit constraints and market risk imply that this (joint period-0 pro…t maximizing) contract is not an optimal one for the endogenously risk-averse …rm D to demand of its supplier. It can be improved by requiring U to share in the risk faced by the downstream …rm D. Intuitively, for U to provide such risk sharing, it must earn more in good states than in bad states (Property 4). Since U earns zero pro…t on average, it must make a loss in the worst state(s). Hence, we can think of U as providing a …xed payment to D, with D then making demand-dependent repayments.
In essence, D is using U to lower the variance of her end-of-period pledgable income by increasing the proportion which is …xed in advance. However, for U to be able to make back this ex ante committed payment the variable payments made to U must increase in volumes by more than the marginal cost of supply. Hence, double marginalization is created. This double marginalization is optimally spread across (almost) all demand states to reduce the temptation D has to misreport the state of demand. As a result, the optimal risk-sharing contract induces retail prices that are (in almost all demand states) strictly higher than p(q(c)). Hence, some of the burden of credit constraints and market risk is borne by consumers.
Our general result appears to us to be re ‡ected in at least two standard business practices: risk-sharing contracts and slotting fees.
Risk-sharing contracts. The payment made by U could be a …nancial transfer directly to D; or a sharing in some costs with repayments dependent upon realized demand. Note that the vertical partner is being required to accept some risk which he is powerless to a¤ect. This is optimal for the credit-constrained …rm as the credit constraints, or rather the possibility of being credit-constrained after some demand realizations, cause her to be endogenously risk averse. If U is a supplier to a large supermarket, D; then it is natural to ask how the slotting fee result would be changed if U were herself credit constrained. An important contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that credit constraints manifest themselves as endogenous risk aversion (Lemma 1). As a result, if U were herself credit constrained in future investments then she would endogenously have a concave utility function as regards the payo¤ from the current period. Let us denote this utility function by U ( ). Now the downstream …rm making take it or leave it o¤ers to her supplier U would have to solve Program Bank with a revised participation constraint for U :
. One could then proceed analogously to above and invoke Hart (1983) once more as U 's utility function maps to risk averse workers in the Hart analysis. The result is that U is still obliged to bear risk and so a slotting fee type contract persists. However as U 's (endogenous) risk aversion becomes more extreme the extent of risk sharing diminishes and so the size of the slotting fee declines, vanishing in the limit of U becoming in…nitely risk averse.
Next, consider double marginalization. Why double marginalization exists in the supply chain is a hotly debated topic as it is a common justi…cation for antitrust interventions in business-to-business markets. If one imagines …rms restrict themselves to linear supply contracts, then ine¢ cient double marginalization is the natural result (Spengler, 1950) .
Linear contracts seem to be a common feature in some industries (see Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2008, for a cable TV example) -even though it would appear to be straightforward to contract around the double marginalization ine¢ ciency, via franchise fees for example. The ine¢ ciency created by double marginalization has been estimated to be as large as 10% of pro…ts (Mortimer, 2008) . A number of theories have been proposed to explain double marginalization (see Katz, 1989 , for a survey). Two we would highlight are double moral hazard (Romano, 1994) and risk sharing between risk-averse …rms.
However, critics have noted that repeat interaction is likely to mitigate the moral hazard problem in the …rst explanation. Moreover, a convincing explanation for risk aversion has been missing with regard to the second explanation. Our work demonstrates that credit constraints (in conjunction with market risk) -widespread in the economy -can induce double marginalization in the short run.
Remark 1 In our analysis, we have allowed for general contracts between the upstream supplier U and the downstream buyer B. Suppose instead that …rms were restricted to two-part tari¤ contracts of the form
where f is a …xed fee and w the per unit input price. It can be shown that, in this case, the equilibrium contract in period 0, (f ; w ), involves double marginalization (in all demand states), w > c, and payment of a slotting fee from the upstream …rm to the downstream …rm,
Implications for Outsourcing
In our model, the upstream …rm U provides (partial) insurance to its downstream buyer
D. An obvious question is whether the insurance can instead be provided by a third party. The answer is, no, if the third party cannot veri…ably observe the input supply (while, arguably, U can). Indeed, in this case, U and D would have an incentive to collude and under-report the supply of input from U to D. (Of course, this is not possible when U provides insurance.) To the extent that the insurance cannot be provided by a third party, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 The credit-constrained downstream …rm D strictly prefers to outsource input production to the non-credit constrained supplier U rather than produce in-house at the same cost.
Proof. Suppose D were to produce the input in-house at marginal cost c. In this case, in e¤ect the supply contract would satisfy W i = cQ i for all states i. Hence, for any demand state realization, the integrated …rm would maximize its payo¤ by solving
This is solved where
That is, the integrated …rm would implement the non-double-marginalized retail price. However, by Proposition 2, Property 2, though implementable, this is not the optimal tari¤ when D is outsourcing input production to U . Hence, D strictly prefers outsourcing to U .
Our model thus provides a new rationale for credit constrained …rms exposed to market risk to outsource supply: the suppliers can provide revenue insurance that a third party cannot to the same extent.
There are many reasons why outsourcing might be a good idea. But the relationship between market risk and outsourcing is still a topic of debate. Empirically, there exists evidence supporting our theoretical results. For example, both Harrigan (1985) analyzing executive interviews and Sutcli¤e and Zaheer (1988) experimentally …nd evidence that …rms do move more production outside the …rm when exposed to demand risk. However the dominant theoretical view is, arguably, that contractual incompleteness combined with demand risk would act to increase vertical integration (see Mahoney, 1992 , for a survey and discussion). 11 Our model suggests a force pushing against integration, which is responsive to market risk.
Complementarities between Supplier Insurance and Banking
In the model as presented so far, the supplier U o¤ers her downstream buyer D some pledgable income insurance. The downstream …rm D then goes to the banking sector to borrow to fund the investment. If U could borrow and lend at the same (zero) interest rate as banks can, then U could take the place of the bank, providing the loan for investment as well as any pledgable income insurance. In fact, this section shows that borrowing from U and committing not to use a separate banking sector strictly dominates using a banking sector. The reason is that, by having to return to U for a loan, D can commit to charge a lower price and therefore one which is less double marginalized. This is because if she under-reports the state in period 0 and so makes extra pro…ts, U can commit not to allow them to be leveraged. This permits D to credibly discipline herself. As a result, this section will o¤er a novel explanation for the existence of supplier …nance arms.
To derive this result, suppose that D committed not to use a banking sector and only deal with U: D would now be proposing the contract fQ i ; T Carlton (1979) o¤ers the same conclusion but in a model of unadjustable input volumes.
invests her available assets and, after the investment returns are realized, she pays U an amount T i 1 that is again conditional on the period-0 demand state. As U is o¤ering the loan, she must ensure that the amount she makes available does not induce D to shirk at the investment stage. To achieve this, U can ask to be veri…ably shown a given level of assets before providing the loan via T
Thus, D can report only that the state is worse than it is -otherwise, she would be found out at the end of period 0. The program to solve with no bank is as follows.
Program No Bank
The optimal program when U provides the loan is given by:
Here, (9) is the individual rationality constraint for U , (10) claim it is j when in fact it is i > j, then her assets will in truth be higher than she would have had under state j: However, the size of her loan T j 0 is not altered. These extra assets cannot, therefore, be leveraged.
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Proposition 4 Using U as a bank strictly dominates using a separate banking sector.
Proof. Consider the optimal tari¤ solving Program Bank: fQ i ; W i g. This is the program when an independent banking sector is used. In state z i ; under this program, D has pledgable income of Q i p
borrowing the di¤erence between these two.
We …rst show that U can replicate the optimal contract D would set if using a banking sector. Suppose
where volumes fQ i g are as in the contract with the separate banks, and T i 1 is the size of the loan provided. Then, equation (9), the individual rationality constraint of U; is satis…ed with equality by (5). By construction of T i 1 , the credit constraint is binding in every state so that the no-shirking constraint (10) always holds with equality. Finally, from the de…nition of the loan, (11)) leaves the no-shirking constraint at the investment stage slack. This is shown by noting that, by de…nition,
Now consider increasing z j to z i : As 0 > 1 B, we must have
The left-hand side is the pro…t available if D borrows T j 1 to invest a total of Q j p
W j leaves the credit constraint slack. We thus obtain
as required. Hence, the period-0 incentive constraint (11) is actually slack (satis…ed strictly).
But as the incentive constraint on the report of the demand state in period 0 is slack, there is room for the transfer of some more risk upstream. Suppose that the quantities are altered to Q i + " for all i < n and the tari¤ W i is increased by "c: The payments Proposition 4 provides a rationale for suppliers maintaining …nance arms, as indeed many major …rms do (e.g., GE, Cisco). The …nance arm will be able to o¤er terms which improve on those from a bank as long as the loan is in part used to purchase goods from the same …rm. This is not because the supplier is trying to buy business. But rather the ability to compare collateral with the volumes purchased can limit the extent to which the …rm can double marginalize and so results in a Pareto improvement. 13 That a supplier with the same access to capital markets as an external bank can lend on rates that the independent banking sector would …nd unpro…table, is a new result. will not as they prefer not to damage a reputation for being willing to renegotiate contract 13 An anecdotal example of this e¤ect is the CEO of GE who is reported as believing that the combination of a …nance arm with their other products is superior to rival good suppliers with no …nance arm. (Financial Times, "GE extends its global reach to the Middle East", July 23, 2008.) 14 This is drawn from the Federal Reserve G20 statistical release. Available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/statisticsdata.htm. terms in the event of covenant default. However, in the Carey et al. data, it is evident that …nancial companies lend to all risk types -and regular banks lend less to risky borrowers and comparatively more to safer borrowers. Interpreted this way, our result matches the empirical …nding. Such a distribution of loans could be explained if there is a complementarity between supplying input and lending, implying that such lenders can make a pro…t even with risky borrowers, whereas banks cannot.
Note that our mechanism does not require that the upstream …rm U provides all of the lending to D. Instead, U may cooperate with banks in a consortium of lenders -with the banks providing "inframarginal"lending (the part of the loan that would be provided even in the worst demand state) and U only providing the "marginal" lending that is sensitive to the reported demand state. In the data on loans analyzed by Carey et al., almost half (44%) of all loans are provided by multiple lenders. While most commonly these consortia comprise only banks, Carey et al. report that the second-most frequent form of consortium is composed of both banks and …nance companies. Thus situations in which a supplier such as U teams up with banks to make loans is not uncommon.
Our mechanism does require the supplier/lender to be able to commit not to leverage assets gained through excessive double marginalization. To achieve this, the borrowing …rm must be limited in its access to further lenders for top-up loans. Covenants could be written to this e¤ect. Indeed, there is evidence that, if lending is undertaken by a consortium, then covenants are more likely to be required (Bradley and Roberts, 2004 ).
The lender must also be able to resist calls to renegotiate.
Interest Rates and Short-Run Prices
Above, we have shown that the interaction between credit constraints and market risk causes a risk-neutral …rm to become endogenously risk averse with respect to its pledgable income. The endogenous risk aversion causes the …rm to seek to push risk on to its vertical partners. How risk averse the …rm is will depend upon market parameters. For example, the anticipated interest rate payable on future investment will alter the relationship between pledgable assets and investment levels and so impact on the extent of endogenous risk aversion. Similarly changes in the quality of monitoring or of corporate governance (the ability to shirk) will alter the level of the credit constraint and so impact endogenous risk aversion and, hence, period-0 contracts. In this section, we will demonstrate that the mechanism identi…ed above generates a channel between the interest rate payable on borrowed sums and the real economy through short-run pricing and long-run investment decisions.
As the interest rate payable on borrowed sums rises, we show that -under some conditions -the relevant measure of D's risk aversion increases. This implies that D seeks to increase the amount of insurance it secures from U . But better insurance exacerbates the double marginalization problem, thereby causing the short-run retail price to rise. Due to the increased double marginalization, the expected level of pledgable income declines.
As a result, the expected long-run investment level declines also. 15 This is a new monetary transmission mechanism between interest rates on …rm borrowing and short-run retail pricing. The mechanism is distinct from the seminal balance sheet channel of Bernanke and Gertler (1995) . In the balance sheet channel, the existing debt position of …rms is worsened as their repayments rise and their net worth falls. This leads to the running down of inventories and a reduction in investment in the medium term. 16 In our model, the interest rate change leads to an alteration in the pro…t-maximizing short-run behavior of the …rm in anticipation of the risk associated with achieving the necessary pledgable income for her future …nance needs. The mechanism identi…ed here therefore impacts short-run retail pricing decisions.
Explicitly, we suppose that money borrowed from the external banking sector between periods 0 and 1 needs to be repaid at an interest rate of r: As D is credit constrained, she will borrow as much as her end-of-period-0 assets allow. The maximal investment level given assets a is denoted I (a; r) and implicitly de…ned by the equation
We must now pose the question of how a change in the interest rate r will alter the optimal contract between the credit-constrained D and U in period 0, and thereby have short-run e¤ects on the real economy. We have established that the credit constraints make D risk averse. Thus the challenge is to determine what the relevant measure of risk aversion is and how it depends on r: Lemma 2 demonstrates that the relevant measure for the fully optimal supply contract is the Arrow-Prat coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion of the investment returns function with respect to pledgable assets:
If an increase in the interest rate r, or indeed a change in any other variable such as monitoring/corporate governance (B) causes this coe¢ cient to rise (fall), then the period-0 retail price will rise (fall). As we are working with the optimal period-0 contract, this e¤ect is not an artefact of a restricted contract class (such as linear or two-part 15 Over the course of the Financial Crisis …rms have faced historically higher borrowing rates. For two years from July 2007, the spread of corporate debt as compared to US treasuries has climbed to levels far in excess of anything experienced over the previous 3 years. Our model predicts a link between the increased cost of borrowing and higher (than myopically optimal) retail prices. 16 See the references in the Introduction and Tirole (2006) for a model. tari¤ contracts), and so cannot be contracted around. Thus the retail price e¤ects are unavoidable.
Lemma 2 Suppose a shift r of the model parameters causes the absolute coe¢ cient of risk aversion of I (a; r) with respect to pledgable assets
to change. Then:
1. Consider all states i < n at which the optimal contract does not involve pooling.
The optimal quantity sold in period 0 moves strictly in the opposite direction to risk aversion. Hence, the short-run retail price in such states changes in the same direction as the coe¢ cient of risk aversion.
2. The result holds weakly at state i < n if the optimal contract in that state involves pooling, Q i 2 fQ i 1 ; Q i+1 g.
Lemma 2 demonstrates that if any alteration in market parameters can be linked to a change in the absolute coe¢ cient of risk aversion of the investment function I ( ) ; then period 0 prices will respond. An increase in endogenous risk aversion will exacerbate the double marginalization problem as more risk is shifted to the vertical partners. And this necessarily leads to higher prices in the short run in all states except the highest and those at which the optimal contract involves pooling. In this section, we focus on the interest rate.
To study this interest rate channel, recall that the no-shirking constraint at the in- We may call (I; r), which measures how the incentive to shirk changes with the investment level, the "marginal incentive to shirk".
By Lemma 2, an increase in the interest rate r will lead to higher retail prices if it increases the coe¢ cient of (absolute) risk aversion of investment returns with respect to pledgable assets. This happens if and only if the induced fractional change in the curvature of I w.r.t. a is larger than the induced fractional change in the slope of I w.r.t. Proposition 5 Suppose the curvature of the technology function, 00 (I) ; is su¢ ciently large in magnitude and declining at higher investment levels (i.e., 000 (I) 0). Then, an increase in the interest rate causes:
1. [ cf. the price puzzle] retail prices to rise in the short run (period 0); 2. the expected level of investment to decline in the long run.
Part 1 of the proposition holds if an increase in the interest rate makes the marginal incentive to shirk more sensitive to the pledgable asset level:
As the interest rate rises, the marginal incentive to shirk, , changes by @ [r 0 (I)] =@r.
On the one hand, increasing r lowers the level of investment for any given level of assets, @I=@r < 0. As the investment return function ( ) is concave, this means that the marginal return to investment rises and so the marginal gain from investing rises. This acts to reduce the marginal incentive to shirk. However, as r rises, a larger fraction of the return must be paid back to the bank which increases the marginal incentive to shirk.
If ( ) is su¢ ciently curved, then the …rst e¤ect dominates so that d =dr < 0. 17 In this case the denominator of the fractional change in the marginal incentive to shirk induced by an increase in the pledgable asset level falls as interest rates rise.
We turn now to the numerator of the fractional change in the marginal incentive to shirk induced by an increase in the pledgable asset level. An increase in the interest rate makes pledgable assets more valuable, thereby increasing the asset-sensitivity of the mar- The fact that investment is lower in the long run now follows as a corollary. For any given realization of assets we have @I=@r < 0 as the increased payback required lowers the level of borrowing which can be sustained. Further, realized assets are lower for any realization of period 0 market demand due to the increased double marginalization established in the …rst part of the proposition. Hence, the expected investment level must decline.
The …rst part of Proposition 5 is closely related to the price puzzle. The price puzzle refers to a long-standing observation in macroeconomics that retail prices appear to rise in the short run when interest rates are raised by the central bank. This is contrary to macroeconomic textbook discussions of the Phillips curve. Textbook macroeconomics would suggest that higher policy interest rates should raise the real interest rate for business investment decisions and so lead to a reduction in investment in the economy. 17 A su¢ cient condition for this is that
This, it is argued, would shrink output below the economy's natural equilibrium level. In the simplest rendition of the theory this output gap puts downwards pressure on wages and hence on prices. Thus higher policy interest rates would be expected to lead to price falls.
However, before this macroeconomic e¤ect occurs, prices (aggregated into an economywide price level) seem to …rst rise for a number of months to a year by a statistically signi…cant amount (Christiano et al., 1999) . The exact size of the price puzzle is in dispute as it varies depending on the extent to which the empirical estimation seeks to control for the link between interest rates and in ‡ation expectations (Balke and Emery, 1994) . But the existence of the price puzzle has become a broadly accepted stylized fact.
Proposition 5 provides a novel explanation of the price puzzle grounded in optimizing …rm behavior.
It might be argued that simpler mechanisms are likely to link increasing interest rates with higher retail prices. One such argument might be that if …rms rent capital each period an increase in the interest rate payable directly raises …rms'marginal cost of production, resulting in higher retail prices. This argument is sensitive to whether the capital stock is …xed or variable in the short run. If the capital stock is …xed in the short run, then interest rate changes would only a¤ect the …xed costs of operation and not the retail prices. And further on its face the Phillips curve approach would seem to rely on some unresponsiveness of the capital stock in the short run. We remain agnostic on the degree of ‡exibility of capital. We merely note that the link between interest rates on borrowing and retail pricing we have determined in our model operates regardless of the ‡exibility of the capital stock.
The monetary transmission mechanism we have determined is a cost-push explanation for the price puzzle. Barth and Ramey (2001) propose that interest rate rises might increase costs and so explain the price puzzle. Indeed, these authors show that in aggregate data the price puzzle has a number of features which suggest that the e¤ect is driven by a supply side (cost) shock rather than a demand shock. Gaiotti and Secchi (2006) extend the empirical analysis of the relationship between interest rates and prices using …rm level data from Italian Manufacturing. They con…rm that a statistically signi…cant cost push channel exists. That is increasing interest rates pushes up retail prices. They …nd that the e¤ect is most pronounced for …rms which carry large amounts of working capital.
The question of whether the size of the working capital bu¤er required is related to the volatility of pro…ts is not discussed in this work. Indeed if pro…ts were not volatile then receipts from sales in the previous period would presumably remove the need for a large capital bu¤er and so cut the link between interest rates and prices. Hence, we conclude by noting that recent research is supportive of a cost push channel for monetary policy.
Our work o¤ers a consistent hypothesis as to why this might be so.
Supply-Side as Opposed to Demand-Side Risk
The analysis so far has modeled market or demand risk relating to the pro…tability of the retail market for the produced goods. In this setting we have shown that market risk and credit constraints interact to produce an endogenously risk averse …rm which seeks to share some of the risk, at a cost, with its vertical partners. Thus we have discovered how retail prices are pushed up; and how market risk creates an incentive to outsource supply processes o¤ to a …nancially unconstrained vertical partner.
One is drawn to consider whether these results are robust to the risk being on the supply side rather than on the demand side of the production process. For example, if the risk concerned the costs of the input due to volatility in the price of some raw material, such as oil, would we still …nd that retail prices are pushed higher by credit constraints and that an incentive to outsource would remain?
In this section, we con…rm the results derived earlier in this paper. Whether risk is on the supply side or demand side, the party exposed to the risk seeks to push some of it onto her vertical partners. This creates a rationale for outsourcing of input manufacturing or distribution. This comes at the cost of higher retail price and thus lower consumer welfare. 18 Formally, we consider the permutation of our baseline model to place risks on the upstream costs and not on the downstream demand. In state i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng, which occurs with probability h i , U 's marginal cost of producing the input is i . As before, D can transform the input into a …nal good at zero cost. But in contrast to the baseline model, (inverse) market demand p(Q) is state-independent. Let q(k i ) denote the joint period-0 pro…t-maximizing output level in state i:
We suppose that U is the party who is in a position to conduct an investment in period 1 and who is credit constrained. Thus U is impacted directly by the risks over the input costs.
We suppose that U makes take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to a now risk-neutral D:
It is immediate that Lemma 1 applies to U: Thus the credit constraints in period 1 combined with input cost risk in period 0 cause U to be endogenously risk averse in period 0. If D could verify the input costs faced by U in period 0 then, analogously to Section 3, one can show that the optimal contract has U requiring D to bear all of the risk. We therefore consider the asymmetric case in which U knows the true input costs but D does not. That is, suppose that D cannot verify the input costs faced by U: In selecting a contract fQ ( i ) ; W ( i )g in period 0, U must solve:
Program U Constrained The optimization program when U uses an independent banking sector is given by
subject to the individual rationality constraint for D;
and the incentive compatibility constraint for U;
The analysis of this model proceeds in a similar, but not identical manner, to that of our benchmark model. The di¤erence arises as D (the party accepting the contract now) is risk neutral in the transfer payment -but not in the quantity delivered. Hence, the proof used by Hart (1983) is not directly applicable. The proof is amenable after an adaptation which is outlined in Appendix A.1:
Proposition 6 Suppose cost states are ordered so that 1 < 2 < : : : < n : The solution to Program U Constrained has the following properties:
Property 2 Too little supply, in higher input cost states
Property 3 U 's pledgable income is higher in lower cost states:
Property 4 D's payo¤ is also higher in lower cost states:
Proposition 6 indicates that the intuitions in the benchmark model where risk was attached to the demand side apply also when risk is attached to the supply side. The optimal contract involves some risk sharing with the partner in the supply chain and so all …rms'ex post pro…ts depend on the realization of the risk (Proposition 6, Properties 3 and 4). Further, in the case of supply-side risk, credit constraints cause the retail price to be overly responsive to increases in the costs of production. Thus retail prices rise faster than an integrated seller would require in the face of rising costs (Proposition 6, Property 2). So, for example, if raw material costs were to be volatile then when they are high the retail price would be pushed even higher than apparently justi…ed by the cost rise due to the credit constraints.
When the risk applies to the supply side, the upstream …rm U gains by having the ability to share risk with the retailer. This is achieved by a franchise fee type contract (Proposition 6, Property 4). This is the analogue of the risk sharing contract under demand side risk. Here the downstream …rm pays a demand independent amount to the supplier which she only recoups in good demand states.
Once again, the outsourcing of the retail channel to a non-credit constrained …rm is valuable to the credit-constrained upstream …rm. The insurance that D o¤ers to U would not be possible if U could sell to an alternative retail outlet which bypassed D without D being aware. Such area exclusivity is often a feature of franchise agreements.
Bargaining in the Supply Chain
The assumption of take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers forms a polar case of bargaining in which one party has all the bargaining power. It is natural therefore to ask how the supply chain agreements we have studied might be a¤ected if bargaining power were more equally shared. In this section, we construct such a model and show that the qualitative features of the supply chain contracts are una¤ected: risk sharing and double marginalization remain (though, of course, the surplus from the interaction is more equitably divided).
In considering bargaining one's …rst impulse might be to reach for the celebrated Nash
Bargaining Solution (NBS). This sets the percentage gain to the parties from a small change in the agreed contract to be equal. However, in the context of our model, this is a di¢ cult construct to work with analytically as the total surplus to be split depends upon the contract agreed. Instead, we opt for a more simple approach to study shared bargaining power. Common with the NBS we assume that bargaining selects a point on the Pareto frontier so that money is not left on the table. We assume that the bargaining power of D as compared to U is captured by the invariant parameter where the agreed solution splits the total rents available parts to D and 1 parts to U: If the size of the pie being bargained over were to be invariant to the agreement, this solution would match the weighted NBS. This approach is not new to the literature -it is known as the proportional bargaining solution (Kalai, 1977) . 19 The main impact of bargaining modeled in this way is that D receives proportion of the whole pie. Hence her incentive to invest is reduced -but the qualitative features displayed in the analysis remain. More formally, consider the following extension to the benchmark model o¤ered in Section 2. We suppose that, in period 1, D requires the input from U to generate the return from investment. This is compatible with the benchmark model: if D could make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to U , then she would demand the input at cost as D is risk neutral in period 1 following the investment. If, however, U has some bargaining power, then she will expect some rents from period-1 trade.
We further maintain the assumption of the benchmark model that only short-run contracts can be negotiated. Thus when bargaining in period 0, the parties are aware that there will be bargaining in period 1 and they can anticipate its outcome. Moreover, we assume that when bargaining in period 1, D's actual investment level is observed by U Program Bargain The optimization program when D and U bargain and leverage from 19 The key axiom generating the proportional bargaining solution is known as the axiom of step-by-step negotiations (Kalai, 1977; p.1627) . The axiom requires that the bargained solution should be invariant to a decomposition of the bargaining process into stages. Thus if the individuals consider …rst a subset of the set of feasible alternatives, reach an agreement on the subset which is then used as the threat point in a second bargaining stage over the remaining alternatives, then the …nal outcome should be the same as the outcome reached if bargaining occurred in just one step.
an independent banking sector is given by
subject to the requirements of the proportional bargaining solution (according to which (1 ) times D's total payo¤ is equal to times U 's total payo¤),
and D's incentive constraint at the quantity-setting stage in period 0:
Note that the proportional bargaining solution condition, equation (16), can only be
Thus Program Bargain and Program Bank are isomorphic if one alters the shirking parameter from B to B : Hence, the results we developed continue to apply.
Some re ‡ection reveals the following intuition. After the investment stage, the parties will bargain to split the rents from trade in period 1 in proportion to D and the remainder to U: At the end of period 0; D will optimally invest all her pledgable income to secure the maximum possible leverage and so the greatest return from period 1 trade. Thus D's return arises only from the pro…ts secured at the end of period 1. If, in period 0, U should bargain for some positive rents, then overall she will secure more than 1 of the total surplus: she will secure 1 proportion in period 1 and more in period 0. This is not possible according to the proportional bargaining solution. Hence, U also defers her extraction of rents until after the investment has occurred thus allowing the pie to be maximized. But then the risk and contracting results we have discussed all apply. The only change is that the incentive to invest is reduced for D -or, analogously, her shirking parameter rises to B :
Conclusions
Credit-constrained …rms are forced to link the scale of their investments to their pledgable assets. This is because the pledgable assets form the collateral for the borrowing required to fund investment. If the investment technology exhibits diminishing marginal returns, then the marginal return to pledgable assets is also diminishing. As a result, risk-neutral …rms become endogenously risk averse with respect to the creation of pro…ts which will form future pledgable income.
A …rm exposed to market risk, endogenously risk averse due to its credit constraints on future investment, will seek to push some market risk onto its vertical partners. This will be re ‡ected in the optimal supply contracts. The …rm will try to reduce the variance of its ex-post pro…t -and hence of its pledgable income. This is done optimally via a risk-sharing contract which involves some demand-independent payment to the …rm and demand-dependent repayments back to its vertical partner(s). This prediction is evidenced in risk-sharing contracts for example in the aircraft manufacturing industry, and in the common practice of charging slotting fees, prevalent in the grocery industry.
However, these contracts come at a cost to consumers in the form of higher prices.
Demand-dependent repayments to the vertical partners raises the …rm's e¤ective marginal cost, inducing an increase in consumer prices. Thus, double marginalization is a necessary feature of optimal supply contracts. So our model establishes a causal link between credit constraints and higher real economy prices.
Our model predicts that …rms exposed to market risk who face credit constraints on their investments will gain by outsourcing supply or sales. Once outsourced, the …rm can enact a value-enhancing supply contract with insurance features. This is possible as the (outsourced) supplier sees the volumes being supplied and so can base payments on this variable. The same insurance cannot be provided by a third party as the …rm and its suppliers could then collude against the insurer if supply volumes were not observable and veri…able. This link between risk and outsourcing is new to the theoretical literature and supported by empirical evidence.
We have demonstrated the existence of complementarities between the provision of insurance by the vertical partners and the provision of loans for investment. A vertical partner that is able to borrow and lend at the same rate as a bank can lend pro…tably to the …rm when, in some instances, the separate bank cannot. This is because the vertical partner observes both the level of pledgable income being levered and the volume of goods sold to generate that income. This allows the vertical partner to limit, but not eradicate, the double marginalization problem created by the need for insurance. This permits lower short-run retail prices and so increases the expected pro…ts and the expected consumer surplus. Such lending by a vertical partner is evidenced by the existence of …nance arms of major companies (such as GE) and other non-bank …nancial companies. Why such non-bank lending arrangements should exist and be thriving is currently not settled in the literature. Our model o¤ers a contribution to this debate.
This paper has demonstrated a new monetary policy transmission mechanism -distinct from the seminal balance sheet channel. The mechanism of this channel is explained by considering how the interest rates payable on investment alter the degree of endogenous risk aversion of the credit constrained …rms. As interest rates rise, the sensitivity of the …rm's investment to pledgable income may rise and so cause the …rm to become more risk averse. The increase in risk aversion results in greater insurance being demanded from the vertical partner(s) so as to prevent very low realizations of pledgable assets. But this means more double marginalization is introduced immediately, resulting in higher …nal goods prices in the short run. This is potentially important in explaining empirically observed price dynamics such as the price puzzle.
A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. We aim to show that:
We …rst characterize the optimal period-0 contract in some more detail. Result 1 in Hart (1983) shows that the set of incentive constraints in Program Bank can be replaced with the following set of (local) constraints:
We now show that (18) must be satis…ed with equality. Suppose not at some state i:
Consider increasing W i to W i + " and lowering W i 1 to W i 1 "(g i =g i 1 ): (18) remains satis…ed if " > 0 is small. The individual rationality constraint of U , equation (5), is una¤ected by construction. D's objective function changes by
where the …rst inequality follows from z i > z i 1 and the concavity of the investment function I ( ) ; while the second equality follows by assumption on (18) . But this is a contradiction to the optimality of the contract. Hence, constraint (18) must be satis…ed with equality.
We next express the optimal period 0 contract purely in terms of quantities fQ i g.
From (18),
The term i measures the industry pro…t gain if D does not lie and claim the state is marginally worse than it is (reporting i 1 instead of i). Iterating, we obtain
From the individual rationality constraint for U ,
where we have swapped the order of summation in the second expression. Thus, equation (19) gives W 1 . Furthermore, we have
Note that the second term on the right-hand side of (20) is independent of i. 
:
Suppose that an increase in assets a reduces the Taylor quotient, 
As assets increase in the state (from (21) < 0. Consider the largest pooled state z l , where Q l 1 = Q l < Q l+1 : Note that l < n as we know that at state n, the e¢ cient quantity z n q (c) is delivered, while at state n 1, there is strictly too little quantity: Q n 1 < z n 1 q (c) < z n q (c) = Q n : As we have Q l 1 (r 1 ) = Q l (r 1 ), the optimization over state l is constrained, so that E which is strictly negative for r 2 r 1 small. Hence, again we have Q l (r 2 ) Q l (r 1 ) :
Finally, we obtain Q l 1 (r 2 ) Q l (r 2 ) Q l (r 1 ) = Q l 1 (r 1 ) ;
where the …rst inequality follows by (17) , the second inequality has just been shown, and the equality follows by assumption.
If, instead, 
Since @I=@a > 0, > 0 (Assumption 2) and so d =da = 00 (I)@I=@a > 0, equation (26) holds implying that equation (26) holds so that an increase in the interest rate results in a larger coe¢ cient of (absolute) risk aversion. Part 1 of the proposition follows from Lemma 2.
For part 2, note that the investment levels fall for any realization of assets as @I=@r < 0 and, further, realized assets are lower for any realization of period 0 market demand (except the largest), due to the lower equilibrium volumes.
A.1 Upstream Risk Analysis
This appendix proves Proposition 6. The proof follows closely that used by Hart (1983, Proposition 2). Here we outline the key steps and any di¤erences. The objective is to …nd the solution to Program U Constrained.
The …rst step is to show that the incentive compatibility constraint (15) can be replaced by the local constraints:
W i Q i i W i+1 Q i+1 i for all i 2 f1; : : : ; n 1g (27) Q i Q i+1 for all i 2 f1; : : : ; n 1g
That (15) implies these two equations follows Hart. The converse remains to be shown.
Here Hart 1983 Lemma 1 does not apply. Instead we have
Lemma 3 (27) must hold with equality at an optimal solution to Program U Constrained, with (15) replaced by (27) and (28):
Proof. Identical to the …rst lines of the proof of Lemma 2 above.
Using Lemma 3, we can demonstrate that a solution to program U constrained with (15) replaced by (27) and (28) satis…es the original program. This now follows Hart again.
Proof of Proposition 6. We …rst show that Q i q ( i ) for all i: Suppose instead that there exists a given i such that
and suppose further that Q i Q i+1 : Consider lowering Q i by " and lowering W i by
which is less than " i : D will accept this change as her expected payo¤ changes by
For small " (28) holds at i and i 1 as Q i > Q i+1 : Next consider the objective function.
This changes by
Thus U bene…ts. Next note that this also implies that (27) holds at i as the left hand side has increased. Finally note that (27) holds at i 1 as W i Q i i 1 is reduced for it is altered by the amount:
This is a contradiction and so if Q i > Q i+1 then we have Q i q ( i ) :
This argument can be extended all along the line and proves result 2 of Proposition 6. As positive quantities are sold result 3 follows as from (15):
using the fact that i+1 > i :
For result 4 we have
And q ( i ) Q i Q i+1 which implies that if costs are i then pro…ts are higher with volume Q i than Q i+1 so the above expression is positive as required.
